The chief concern of psycho-analysis is a Sisyphean one [resembling the compulsive tics of a neurotic]: the building of a halfway-house between life and the world. It is not suited to the nurturance of mutinies; it is no more or less than a demand for reflective philosophy. Psycho-analysis is a genitally driven pursuit, or an imponderable and hieratic jouissance, of the analyst whose constitutive principles can only be accessed obliquely in his hunger for the fantasmatic objet a of full jouissance, or fraudulent psycho-analytic closure, as it is reflected in the analysand. But, behind this occult projection of the analyst we must find again “…the dissatisfaction that is itself the motor of drives…” quasi-transcendentally presupposing the givenness and ipseity of the analysand in the psycho-analyst’s self-referential discourse.
The givenness of the analysand is half the culpability of the psycho-analytic fraud; the other half of culpability for deceit must be offered up by the constitutive fantasying of the analyst. We may say, then, that just as “…individuals routinely opt for (unconscious) choices that don’t accord with the balancing act of the pleasure principle”, and just as “[n]eurotics frequently “choose” to repeat painful experiences at the behest of the aspect of Trieb that unreasonably disregards empirical circumstances, namely, Wiederholungszwang (repetition compulsion)”, the psycho-analyst too must persist, in principle, with the jouissance-imago offered up by the pursuit of a quasi-transcendental objet a concealed and presented as the analysand’s traumatic das ding.
The viewpoint of the psycho-analyst is an imaginary one. He is analogically situated in the recording apparatus of a camera, but he endeavours to look into the eyes of the photographer—backwards—rather than to-wards the projected frame of the picture to be taken. This explains the analyst’s facility at unpacking the imaginary space which “…the subject prim-ordially identifies with the visual Gestalt of…” his “…own body … an ideal unity, or salutary imago…”. The analyst, who gazes into the proper core of human subjectivity, is no more or less than an analysand in his capacity as an analyst. Then, the analyst is an analyst only when he is simultaneously the embodied egoity of “the different phases of the imaginary, narcissistic…” and “…specular identification – the three adjectives are equivalent”. The relationship of the analyst and the analysand inasmuch as it is imaginary is one of consensual fraud. But, is there any other kind?
The psychism of consensual fraudulence which inaugurates psycho-analysis is to be trusted with the “…blind alleys of the imaginary experience…” as the chief hermeto-logist, and hermeneut, precisely because it is not moved by the fantasmatic lure that has historicised the analysand and the expressions of his desire personally. The analyst, by decision, “…knows better than anyone else that the point is to figure out [entendre] to which ‘part’ of…discourse the significant term is relegated…” from among the various vellities presented as self-evidence and sense certainty. There is more than a little disingenuousness in Lacan’s dead pan provocation: the analyst “…takes the description of an everyday event as a fable addressed as a word to the wise, a long prosopopeia as a direct interjection, and contrariwise, a simple slip of the tongue as a highly complex statement, and even the rest of a silence as the whole lyrical development it stands in for”. Of course, the analyst does these things, but the manner of this doing is pre-overdetermined by a hermeto-logy outside of its self-explanatory prowess. The prosopopeic imagination of the analyst who pretends to treat a fable as a fact is guided by the traumatic and repressed introjection of an inexistent das ding: the analyticity of the analysand. Also, likewise, the complications disguised by a slip of the tongue emerge as psycho-analytic data precisely insofar as the introjection of an inexistent das ding constitutes the object a of psycho-analytic closure: the analysability of an analysand. And, while the analyst knows there is no closure, the topological net of his theory is geared to pick up on the Gestalt which precedes the analysand’s fantasmatic relation to an-other imagination.
The fictitiousness of a fable and the analyticity of logical propositions are informed by the structure of language; merely reorienting the subjective enunciatory locus of communication cannot illumine psycho-analysis simply because psycho-analysis doesn’t accept the illumination of the self-evidence of linguistic data. Fabulousness and facticity are second order concretions of a quasi-transcendental parallax which Lacanian psycho-analysis invokes despite itself, in a pre-given repetitive-compulsive Trieb that motivates its frames of reference to a gestalt of psycho-analyticity.
1. Johnston, Adrian. “The Forced Choice of Enjoyment: Jouissance between Expectation and Actualization”. Lacan. com. Available from < http://www.lacan.com/forced.htm >.
4. Lacan, Jacques. Trans. Fink, Bruce. (2006). Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English. London, UK: W. W. Norton & Company. § 113, p. 92.
5. The proper dimension of reason which Žižek and Lacan have taken as the limit imposed on understanding by primal repression. It is the knowledge that any human evaluating agent “…is permanently split and bears a gap within itself, a wound, an inner distance that can never be overcome: something Lacan demonstrated over and over again in an extraordinarily complex (and dialectical) articulation of the original Freudian models. But taken at this level of generality it is a view that might easily lead to social pessimism and conservatism, to a view of original sin and the incorrigibility of some permanent human nature” [Jameson, Frederic. (2006). “First Impressions”. London Review of Books. par. 12].
6. Jacques-Alain Miller ed. (1988). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book I. London, UK: Cambridge University Press. p. 188.
Ibid. p. 272.
7. Lacan, Jacques. Trans. Fink, Bruce. (2006). Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English. London, UK: W. W. Norton & Company. § 252, p. 209.