“The transcendental definition of the secret–that is, its real, and not even its nominal or ideal definition—is the following: the secret is the strictly unreflected upon form of truth that, given to itself, gives nothing of itself and receives nothing of itself except the modality in which it is given. This is only possible if it is the One or the Indivision, the Without-division, which is given to itself in its specific (that is, indivisible) modality. The secret is the veritas transcendentalis itself as finite”
—Laruelle, François. Trans. Galloway, Alexander, R. (2010).
The analyst’s desire is “…a desire which intervenes when, confronted with the primary signifier, the subject is, for the first time, in a position to subject himself to it”. This desire operates in the intersubjective space of the session which is an analogue of everyday life experience, with but one caveat: the conditions of routine coherence, manners and usual social conventions are done away with. The uniquely Lacanian intervention of the Short Session emblematises the autodetermining spectrality of the analyst’s discourse. Even if briefly, the analyst moves, and must move, into the position of the analysand; rearranging his free speech, responses, observing his tics and symptomal excesses etc., as though the mind of the analysand were inside the head of the analyst. Or, as if there were some heirophany impressing upon psycho-analytic theory from with-out.
In this lability of the analytic session a nonspatio-temporal complex—which is quasi-transcendental— arises in between the analyst and the analysand to symbolise and overcode a battery of “…‘nexûs, ‘societies’, and ‘enduring objects’. For instance, our body is an enduring object, and a chair is a ‘society’”. Yet, the interpretant schemata of the psycho-analyst are not the same as that of everyday language used by everymen, and its axiomatic scepticism against adequacy is of essence to the Lacanian notion of transference. The psycho-analytic session begins with transference and yet “…the key meaning of transference, for Lacan, is this supposition that there is an Other supposed to know the truth of my communicative acts, even down to the most apparently meaningless ‘slips’ and symptomatic behaviours…transference is the condition of possibility for the quilting of the meaning of floating signifiers that occurs even in the most basic sentences… What occurs in a psychoanalytic interpretation is simply one more consequential version of this process. The subject, by speaking, addresses himself to some Other supposed to know her/his truth, and at the end of this process, the signifiers he offers to the Other are quilted, and return to him ‘in an inverted form’”.
The correlation between objects and subjects, or the analysand and the analyst is equal to the consensual everyday linguistic one that can be “retroactively determined” by the analysand in connivance, or un-animous-ly, with the analyst’s Oedipalisation. From being wary of the fantasies of the analysand, the analyst comes to appreciate the crypto-holism of his own preconscious beliefs. And, in the lack of any relation between Lacanian theory and the phallic object it christens as “…the non-relative, never present, pseudo cause…” as the relata of the “…phallic object…” to locate the dark precursor of the shadow of the phallic object”, or ego-object in Freud’s terms, the theoretical scope of psycho-analysis becomes both phallus and castration. The analyst must entertain patently absurd propositions, “…imbecility which is neither individual nor the corporate variety…” but the imbecility of the analyst’s “…source” which “is” the “subjective” predetermination of thought.
Ultimately the problem of what the analyst knows, or does not, has been p-re-assigned to an-Other, indeed this homunculus has been passed off as the hermetological, Indivisible Oedipus complex. The analyst is no better grounded for his a priori [dis]-belief in the analysability and analyticity of the analysand because all discourse emanates from the indivisible secret of communicability qua instinct, and becomes a revelation of its revelation as discourse in the very process of becoming Oedipalised. A commendable blow to this naïveté is Laruelle’s theorem against any secreting procedure that produces “…the surface effects of hermeto-logical Difference”, for indeed, “[t]he essence of the secret knows nothing of the play of veiling and unveiling, of the structure of difference in general. It is the One, understood in an absolutely immanent and finite way; it excludes the play of Being and play in general”. The capitalised [O]ther is but the engram of necessity which is appreciated non-experientially by the Lacanian psycho-analyst; it is his Oedipalisation by first principle. The secret lack of the psycho-analytic object that substantiates the imaginary gestalts of the analyst interpreting the contributions of the analysand with his pre-conscious theoria, and hindsight, is it-self the psycho-analyst’s unattainable Objet a and its irrepressible, melancholic remembrance of jouissance^ : the analyst’s Objet a as Oedipalised a-nalyst is his non-entity.
On admitting to the impossibility of “discourse” in any coherent theoretical sense, the analyst’s experiences an ennobling castration, which inaugurates the symbolic domain of meaningful intercourse between himself as a person and the analysand as an interlocutor/client, the analyst becomes cognizant of his lack  through inter-subjectivity . But after partaking of this wisdom he continues as if his Oedipalisation has no reality. What begins with the irreducibility of the Oedipal cut ends in the fragmented projections of haphazard subject positions now seen as the objectified analysability of the analysand by the jouissance of the analyst and his predictive diagnosis of the analysand’s desire functions as if on a certain Transcendental Grace, a certain prognostication of the a past which the analysand no more possesses than the irretrievable lost object of pre-Oedipal affectivity. Accordingly, the symptoms as described by the analyst in interpretations is more indicative of the analyst’s own fantasmatic relation with the objet d’ a-nalysability, et a-nalyticity, of the analysand rather than with the traumatic das ding which separates the analyst from the ear of the Indestructible Other that alone understands the psycho-analytic data produced in a session.
Between the analyst and the analysand in the analytic session we see a transcendental deduction where the terms of discourse and their object nexûs negotiate in an occult manner the forces of instinct. This production of givenness as subjectivity itself from with-out the ego-cathexis of linguistic and logical conventionalism depends on the assumption that what is is best. This doesn’t explain the necessity of an un-experiential analysability and analyticity assumed to reside between the analysand’s das ding and the analyst’s Objet a-nalysis. The conditions of routine linguistic conventionalism, manners and usual social Oedipal entities are done away with, precisely so that the transpersonal-ity of the Other may push the analysand towards his traumatic das ding. But the analyst must occupy the no-where-no-place of the Objet a-nalysability and Objet a-naliticity; the sore product of his Ich. The fleeting impressions of a session are to be judged by a definitionally inexperienced theoria that is atelic and non-local.
This desire of the analyst for analysis relies on a given conviction of the adequacy or analyticity of everyday language. The givenness of language belongs to the pre-conscious system [in Freud’s topographical notion of the unconscious, pre-conscious and unconscious] in the strong, constitutive, sense of instinctual imprints that append sense-certainty with a Gestalt of what can be from henceforth be called a commonsensical, or even law-governed world. The analyst pretends as if it were the case that there is no givenness in language, and as if it were infinitely malleable; but his Objet a-nalysability and Objet a-naliticity depends on the pre-conscious autodetermination of language as an indivisible system of the Oedipal cut. This originally repressed apologia for the neurotic/psychotic discourse of the analyst is an analogue of the atelic and non-local gestalt of his fantasmatic relation to the Objet aⁿ of psycho-analysis. Then, this move from an implicit faith in a baseline logical conventionalism embedded in language taken uncritically serves equally to over-determine the Oedipal edifice of psycho-analysis as it is amended in Lacanian terms, and also to persist in the instinctual drive towards traumatic jouissance*. If language co-informs the primordial instincts of the analysand, and thus constitutes his mental life as the determination of his instincts, we are left with no recourse but to acknowledge the Oedipalisation of psycho-analytic insight as the first and last instance of a fantasmatic determination, the Indivisible hermeto-logical phallus as a Totem to come.
^ < http://slothrop.com/2012/11/06/you-didnt-make-me-come-what-is-enjoyment-in-zizek-and-lacan/ >.”In its ordinary use, the word “jouissance” is a noun (the verb is jouir) and it has various connotations (sexual, intellectual, emotional) that revolve around the idea of something intense, overwhelming and in some way meaningful. Orgasm is jouissance — the verb jouir accommodates that sense, as in “to come” — but jouissance is not only orgasm.You can say “Je jouis de cette conversation” — which, in English could be something like “I take intense pleasure in this conversation.” But if we were to play with the English language a bit and say “This conversation makes me come!” it’s doubtful anyone would fail to catch what is intended by it. No, the Lady of the House does not wish to imply that she was shamefully seduced —at the dinner table! — by the Visiting Gentleman’s eloquence to the point of literal orgasm. But by bringing attention to that idea of the metaphorical orgasm, “This conversation makes me come!” is a better way of getting to usefulness of jouissance. It is not just sex and its conclusion in orgasm that matters in understanding the word that Lacan then twists into a new series of meanings. Still, it is the strongest image with which to begin”. Laruelle, François. Trans. Galloway, Alexander, R. (2010). “The Truth According to Hermes: Theorems on the Secret and Communication”. Parrhesia. Number 9. 2010. § 5. p. 18-22. Original emphases retained.
 Lacan, Jacques. Ed. Alain-Miller, Jacques. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. New York, USA: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 276
 “…the ‘variable-length session’ is, in fact, in almost all cases a short session…time in between sessions is supposedly used as a “time for comprehending” (to use a term Lacan introduces in his paper on ‘logical’ time – Écrits, 210), a time in which the material raised in the session can be developed, worked on, and re-organised by the analysand themselves” [“The Short Session”, Lacan. Com. July, 2010. See here < http://www.lacanonline.com/index/2010/07/the-short-session/ > .
 “…According to Wing Tsit Chan (1968), ‘the validity of principles can be tested only in actual events. As a matter of fact, Chinese philosophers generally do not distinguish between reality and actuality’.1When one starts to face experience as theoretical, we cease to wonder where experience starts and where does it stop; it’s everywhere and, because of its social character, we don’t have to get entangled by supervenient guessings,2 for the very reason that experiences gather, and aggregate together, forming, following the Whiteheadian taxonomy, some ‘nexus’, ‘societies’, and ‘enduring objects’. For instance, our body is an enduring object, and a chair is a ‘society’.3” See Bothereau, Fabrice. “Atomism and Atelic Conceptualisation”. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 16, No. 9–10, 2009, p. 222. pp. 221–28.
 Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource. Jacques Lacan. (1901-1981). See here < http://www.iep.utm.edu/lacweb/ >. “c. The Curative Efficacy of the ‘Talking Cure’”. Par. 35.
 Žižek, Slavoj. (2010). “Deleuze and the Lacanian Real”. The Symptom 11, Spring 2010 – “Universalism versus globalization. This at least will be our US chapter – to be read as United Symptoms,” Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. See here < http://www.lacan.com/symptom11/?p=346 >. Par. 3.
 “The prosopopeic imagination of the analyst who pretends to treat a fable as a fact is guided by the traumatic and repressed introjection of an inexistent das ding: the analyticity of the analysand. Also, likewise, the complications disguised by a slip of the tongue emerge as psycho-analytic data precisely insofar as the introjection of an inexistent das ding constitutes the object a of psycho-analytic closure: the analysability of an analysand. And, while the analyst knows there is no closure, the topological net of his theory is geared to pick up on the Gestalt which precedes the analysand’s fantasmatic relation to an-other imagination” Jacan, Lacques. “Book I. Of Fraud, Fantasmatic Closure & Faux-Freudianism”. Lacques Jacan. See here < http://lacquesjacan. wordpress.com/2013/03/27/book-i-of-fraud-fantasmatic-closure-faux-freudianism/ >.
 Lacan, Jacques. Trans. Fink, Bruce. (2006). “Seminar on the Purloined Letter”. Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English. New York, USA: W. W. Norton & Company. § 25, p- 17.
 Laruelle, François. Trans. Galloway, Alexander, R. (2010). “The Truth According to Hermes: Theorems on the Secret and Communication”. Parrhesia. Number 9. 2010. § 9. p. 18-22. Original emphases retained.
 Lacan, Jacques. Trans. Fink, Bruce. (2006). “Critique of Associationism”. Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English. New York, USA: W. W. Norton & Company. § 75, p. 60.
 “Lacan is antipsychological. There’s only one message—live with mediation! —even if it takes a lot of work to accept it”. Beardsworth, Sara. (2004). Julia Kristeva: Psychoanalysis and Modernity. New York, USA: SUNY Press. p. 58.
 By analyticity I mean to invoke the naïve semantic contents of objects as they are identified in everyday language that divides the world of physical experience into the linguistic catagories of genus, and their distinctive, or differentiable features.