This anal dribble discusses the precise moment wherein the sur-real cathexes of ego-objects as imaginary object egos—that remain inaccessible to hermeneutic probity by dissolving the spatiotemporal nexus of the body into the organic fellowship of imagines—are put to trial by the nonreflective puissance of the Cogito, which symptomatically comes to nominate and qualify a subject/signifier dualism supposed to be.
“Things, whether sweat or sap flows in you, / Forms, whether begotten from forge or flood, /Your stream is not denser than my dream, /And if I do not strike you with unceasing desire, // I cross your water and fall to the shore / Brought down by the weight of my thinking genie . . . // But, as soon as all words have died in my throat, / Things, whether begotten from blood or forge, / Nature, – I lose myself in elementary flux: // He who smolders in me, the same lifts you up, / Forms, whether sweat or sap flows in you, / It is the fire that makes me your eternal lover . . .”
—Jacques Lacan. Panta Rhei/Hiatus Irrationalis. Le Phare de Neuilly, 1933.
The world of propositional contents is negatively charged by the bodily-desiring strata of unconscious psychisms, as the mirror stage elaborates, through a characteristically narcissistic impulse that insinuates significatory implicature into the very primordial nullity of the arbitrary emanations of the one signifier—produced auto-nomously by the desire-of-desire-to-know its object in oneself/a-n-Other as a fulfilment of the world in the imago of the one. The lability of the signifier, in Lacan’s hands, gains its vital élan through the flexuous, utilitarian authenticity of the propositional content of desire. The fantasmatic closure which the symbolic order of language makes possible is no more than a naïve identificatory narcissism, conditioned as determination of analytic desire in the last instant, through the concretion of the analyst’s preconscious psychisms in a becoming Oedipal of the analyst; his symptomal witness bearing and responsibility towards symptoms. The sense perceptions that synthesise analytic experience gain their substantiality, and opacity, from the spaltung of the analyst, from her intentional semblant ‘a’ refracted into two batteries of possible signifying regimes. Do they not?
A regime of reality which remains in-accessible as the minimal/liminal gap between propositional adequacy and apodicity of the psycho-analytic project legitimised by the big Other a-nalyst’s jouissance, and the objet analyticity of his knowledge <the form of the question> that makes analyticity analysable comes to inaugurate the analytic Cogito. This Cogito is avowedly Oedipal.
The regime of pure nothingness, is like the Hegelian dark night of the soul, wherein the big Other a-nalyst disavows himself, and his previous semblabilities; here, it is realised that “[t]here is no unconscious…”, not even wrongness capable of deception or rebuttal through its analyticity, “…except for the speaking being” in and for himself among others of his fellowship with the flesh.
This very ineradicable sociality at the heart of the imagine[s] that privilege[s] personal imagination and its significatory latescence with-in the affective engram of the sign[s] taken as analyticity is the narcissistic cathexis of an ego-object. The specular conception of the truth of desire is merely a symbolic access-ory to a totality of imaginary semblations that are identical to identity as conceived in the body imago: the body as the truth. The larval sup-position of the a-nalyst is informed by the promptness of appearances which fill in the chipped, fragmentary semblants of analyticity impressed upon the body of the analyst by “…the traits of the image of its fellow”, i.e. its imaginary fellows both “…gregarious” and “solitary” as they keep the Law of the big Other a-nalyst who understands their devout perplexity.
What matters is not the sublation of reality into actuality but the narrative embodiment of affective investitures as they determine the aetiological gestalt of the present. Thought is embodied in action, but action is an analogue of thought only retroactively made responsible to tokens of actuality, as it chafes against the fabric of time and space.
The thing about all talk of thought is that the resultant discourse is automatically reified, as it tarries with the formal markings of the dead letter it becomes a-nother battery of signifiers, and suggests itself more as hostage to a distal but imaginary praxis than as a radical redoubling of sense certainty into absolute awareness by way of symbolic accessions. The semblant of the prepotentiated a-nalyst marks the form-a-tion, or inaugural admission of desire of the analyst for there to be a discernability latched onto existence; indeed, a veritable mirage of the self in the mirror of phenomena colliding with-in the freely suspended wherewithal of a session; the semblance of semblation derived from the imagination of the analyst is her desire for the conceptual body of work/ work of the body to be recapitulated in the complex of the death drive.
Ultimately, the notion of thought beyond the figurative speech of desire as the grammalogue that gives itself to reflection as a gestaltic given demands receipt as mere and caustic scepticism. The cultivated distraction which inhibits the analyst’s bildung is not of the order of mere contingency, it officiates the nomologically anterior engram of the anal-yst who takes heed from the imaginary gestaltism of the big Other a-nalyst. Then, the a-nalyst whose provenance extends across the being of the analyst by penetrating his innermost intentions and subjective relation[s] to jouissance, by the very auspice of the concept of conceptual possibility, and its prodigal objet d’ analysis, is only a proposition entailed by the regime of the allmighty semblable of semblation, and its analytic adequacy. This semblable of semblation emerges as the predetermining horizon of the session and an inavouable subject position which the analyst occupies axiomatically.
Bowie, Malcolm. (1993). Lacan. New York, NY: Harvard University Press.
Dor, Joel. Feher-Gurewich, Judith & Fairfield, Susan, Eds. (2004). Introduction to the Reading of Lacan: The Unconscious Structured Like a Language. New York, USA: Other Press, LCC.
Rabaté, Jean-Michel. Ed. (2003). The Cambridge Companion to Lacan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 Rabaté, Jean-Michel. Ed. (2003). The Cambridge Companion to Lacan. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
 Lacan, Jacques. Trans. Gallagher, Cormac. “Seminar 2: Wednesday 22, November, 1961”. The Seminars of Jacques Lacan: Book IX Identification 1961- 1961. II. p. 12.
 “The basis of the imaginary order is the formation of the ego in the “mirror stage”. Since the ego is formed by identifying with the counterpart or specular image, “identification” is an important aspect of the imaginary. The relationship whereby the ego is constituted by identification is a locus of “alienation”, which is another feature of the imaginary, and is fundamentally narcissistic. The imaginary, a realm of surface appearances which are deceptive, is structured by the symbolic order. It also involves a linguistic dimension: whereas the signifier is the foundation of the symbolic, the “signified” and “signification” belong to the imaginary. Thus language has both symbolic and imaginary aspects. Based on the specular image, the imaginary is rooted in the subject’s relationship to the body (the image of the body)” Žižek, Slavoj. Lacan dot Com. See < http://www.lacan.com/zizekchr o1.htm >.
 Bowie, Malcolm. (1993). “Inventing the ‘I’”. Lacan. New York, NY: Harvard University Press. p. 34.
 “There are some beliefs, the most fundamental ones, which are from the very outset ‘decentered,’ beliefs of the Other; the phenomenon of the…” analyst “‘…supposed to believe,’ is thus universal and structurally necessary. From the very outset, the speaking…” analyst “…displaces his belief onto the big Other…” a-nalyst “…qua the order of pure semblance, so that the…” analyst “…never ‘really believed in it’; from the very beginning, the…” analyst “…refers to some decentered other” a-nalyst ‘…to whom he imputes this belief. All concrete versions of this analyst ‘…supposed to believe’ (from small children for whose sake parents pretend to believe in Santa Claus, to the ‘ordinary working people’ for whose sake Communist intellectuals pretend to believe in Socialism” to the a-nalyst supposed to know who must pretend to be revealed to the analysand as a pure symptom in himself) are stand-ins for the big Other…” a-nalyst. The big Other a-nalyst is the reflected semblance of the analyst wherein he discerns the form of the question posed by his own preconscious in an economy of surplus jouissance produced by the pursuit of the objet d’ a-nalysis” Lacques, Jacan. (2013). “Reflections on Alan Roland (2011)”. Lacques Jacan. See < https://lacquesjacan.wordpress.com/2013/ 04/08/reflections-on-alan-roland-2011/ >.
 The polyvalence that Freud added unto spaltung, or splitting, bespeaks the imaginary givenness of the one psychism that splits without expenditure into being for oneself and being for another—the engram of a mind “…divided into agencies…a psychic agency…divided within itself”. See Dor, Joel. Feher-Gurewich, Judith & Fairfield, Susan, Eds. (2004). Introduction to the Reading of Lacan: The Unconscious Structured Like a Language. New York, USA: Other Press, LCC. p. 129.
 “…the relationship between subjectivity and desire is one of simultaneity, both logical and chronological. When individual and experiential—when, in other words, lived—desire is the use (qua both mode and effect) the subject makes of the broad spectrum of physiological, discursive, affective, ideological, as well as psychological objects it finds*; it is in such a finding that the operations of desire lie” Abou-Rihan, Fadi. (2011). “desire, briefly”. The Psychoanalytic Field. See < http://thepsy choanalyticfield.com/2011/11/04/desire-briefly/ >.
 “What does one know? One knows the form of the question. The faculty of this knowledge learns its learning through, and despite, “…a domain of significations that continues to exist”…, as the unsupposed content of the form of the question. As we have seen earlier, the avowedly Oedipal a-nalyst must begin to unlearn the interpsychological bêtise,—his creti-nous fixation for the real—, a predilection for interpellating himself into the rational collective of the imaginary relation, and, as its fragile framework of coevality with the other’s semblability [capacity for standing in as semblable for the analysand^, in his fantasmatic relation with the object of his desire]” Jacan, Lacques. (2013). Oddities or Even-tualities? D’être Bêtement Objectif. Lacques Jacan. See < http://lacquesjacan.word press.com/2013/04/03/oddities-or-even-tualities-detre-betement-objectif/ >.
 “The correlation between objects and subjects, or the analysand and the analyst is equal to the consensual everyday linguistic one that can be “retroactively determined” by the analysand in connivance, or un-animous-ly, with the analyst’s Oedipalisation. From being wary of the fantasies of the analysand, the analyst comes to appreciate the crypto-holism of his own preconscious beliefs. And, in the lack of any relation between Lacanian theory and the phallic object it christens as “…the non-relative, never present, pseudo cause…” as the relata of the “…phallic object…” to locate the dark precursor of the shadow of the phallic object”, or ego-object in Freud’s terms, the theoretical scope of psycho-analysis becomes both phallus and castration. The analyst must entertain patently absurd propositions, “…imbecility which is neither individual nor the corporate variety…” but the imbecility of the analyst’s “…source” which “is” the “subjective” predetermination of thought” Lacques, Jacan. (2013). ‘Book I. i/II “Objet a & the Oedipal Objet d’ a-nalyst: The Hermeto-logical Phallus’. Lacques Jacan. See < https://lacquesjacan.wordpress.com/2013/03/28/book-i-iii-objet-a-the-oedipal-a-nalyst-the-hermeto-logical-phallus/ >.
 The relation with the semblable order of the One is such that the One is installed as God. Accordingly, “…the approach of the subject consciousness with the eternal reason of God: this culminates in the death and resurrection of…” God “…in the final moment of religious consciousness; the dark night of the soul; the speculative Good Friday in which God is dead, that concludes the logical sequence of historical religions; dissolves all nature, objectivity, and natural religion into the subjective stages of consciousness; and reconstructs each and all according to the Spirit of…” fidelity, the apostolic…” community of the big other a-nalyst and his semblable emanations, “…and the Gospel of speculative philosophy” Haecker, Ryan & Varn, Derick, C. (2013). Interview with Ryan Haecker on Right Hegelianism and Christian Theology. Symptomatic Commentary. See < http://www.symptomaticcommentary.wordp ress.com/2013/04/13/interview-with-ryan-haecker-on-right-hegelianism-and-christian-theology/ >.
 Lacan, Jacques. “Television”: Lacan on the unconscious. YouTube. See < http://youtu.be/URsYj-TVFjc >.
 “The processes through which this falling into pattern, or emergence of form from instincts, come to impress their engram upon the person are of the order of Freudian primary processes: “…condensation, displacement, symbol formation, dramatization…symbolic processes essential in dreams, symptoms and…artistic creativity” Lacques, Jacan. (2013). Reflections on Alan Roland (2011). See < https://lacquesjacan.wordpress.com/2013/04/08/reflections-on-alan-roland-2011/ >.
 Lacan, Jacques. Trans. Gallagher, Cormac. “Seminar 2: Wednesday 22, November, 1961”. The Seminars of Jacques Lacan: Book IX Identification 1961- 1961. p. 12.
 “The rational assumption that the total series of all conditions is already given would hold only for things in themselves. In the realm of appearances, the totality is never given to us, as finite discursive knowers. The most we are entitled to say, with respect to appearances, is that the unconditioned is set as a task, that there is a rational prescription to continue to seek explanations (A498/B526-A500/B528). As finite (sensible) cognizers, however, we shall never achieve an absolute completion of knowledge. To assume that we can do so is to adopt the theocentric model of knowledge characteristic of the dreaded transcendental realist” Grier, Michelle. Zalta, Edward, N., Ed. (2012). “Kant’s Critique of Metaphysics”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edition). See <http://plato.stan ford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/kant-metaphysics/>.
 “it’s a big knot that holds us psychically together, by way of signifiers (utterance) to which we unconsciously provide meaning (signification). So, it’s not easy to explain; it’s not a simple diagram, from here to there, but complex and contradictory ways the subject is ‘created’ through speech and grammar, out of difference and lack”. “Ask an Analyst”. Lacan dot Com. See < http://lacan. org/ask-an-analyst >.
 “In one’s own personal analysis one may come to see the workings of the unconscious, from the ‘inside,’ so to speak. Being surprised by one’s own ‘blind spots’ and narcissistic pretensions, the future analyst may come to see how she has been formed through signifiers, by way of her apprehension of the Other’s desire. This kind of undertaking may take years” Shane, Anna. The Technique of Psychoanalysis. The Symptom. See < http://www.lacan.com/symptom6_articles/shane-technique.html >.
 Just as in Hegelianism where “[a]ll thought from the barest manifold of intuition to the most majestic apprehension of the entire cosmos is ideal participation in the divine life of God” Haecker, Ryan & Varn, Derick, C. (2013). Interview with Ryan Haecker on Right Hegelianism and Christian Theology. Symptomatic Commentary. See < http://www.symptomaticcommentary.wordpress.com/ 2013/04/13/interview-with-ryan-haecker-on-right-hegelianism-and-christian-theology/ >.
 “…the self-destructive drive to return nature to the state before one’s birth. “There is no archive without consignation in an external place which assures the possibility of memorization, of repetition, of reproduction, or of remission” and this compulsion to repetition “remains…indissociable from the death drive” (11-12). The death drive inciting us to destroy and provides the impetus to archive” Arycman. (2009). “Jacques Derrida’s Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Trans. Eric Prenowitz. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London, 1995”. The Other Reality. See < http://otherreality.wordpress.com/tag/jacques-derrida/ >.
 “…the avowedly Oedipal a-nalyst must begin to unlearn the interpsychological bêtise,—his creti-nous fixation for the real—, a predilection for interpellating himself into the rational collective of the imaginary relation, and, as its fragile framework of coevality with the other’s semblability [capacity for standing in as semblable for the analysand^, in his fantasmatic relation with the object of his desire]” Jacan, Lacques. (2013). “Oddities or Even-tualities? D’être Bêtement Objectif”. Lacques Jacan. See < https://lacquesjacan.wordpress.com/2013/04/03/oddities-or-even-tualities-detre-betement-objectif/ >.