There is No Analyst

Lacques Jacan

Abstract

We will examine here the reasons why the inexistence of an analyst need not hamper the psycho-analytic process. The anal erotic disposition which circumscribes the act of communicative efficacy undergirds all analytic endeavours inasmuch as it evokes, contaminates even, the methods that appertain to affective adaptive stages in the childhood of the subject, as much as they influence the dissemination of psycho-analytic doctrine. Yet, the noncoincidence between the mis-communicated signifiers of the big Other a-nalyst, and the discourse of the dualism between knowledge and the desire to know radicalises the scope for analytic intervention: we appeal to the synthetic gestalt intimated to us by the preconscious order of the symbolic, the Freudian unconscious, and the relation these bear to the analytic imagination which construes of reality as a pre-determination of the self as the One and only semblable.

Virtual Actuality as a-nalytic Objet

Parsimony, pedantry and the predilection for order, indeed an avarice for the ordination of experience, and its myriad contents, into the nominal sufficiency of the relata of these experiential signifiers, mark out the anal eroticism[1] of all tasks that demand their range of semantic discursivity. Not the least of these essential virtues being attendant to the thankless transpiration of affective charges even through the necessary evil of writing, instruction, speech all anal eroticism bears the prefiguration of a natal affinity to the instinct of workmanship. The keenness demanded by the process of per-form-a-tive bildung, as in writing, projects and hermeto-logises the preconscious insinuations of desire as ‘discourse’ through the splicing of vocables and speech is much as that demanded by the act of naming the name itself—a desire mediated in the last instant. To describe a regime of signifiers that constellated this ‘event’ is not to touch upon the nomological force of the discursive field of its perceptual experience but to excrete upon an unmediated synchrony the noncoincidence of semantic relata evoked with reference to the fricative agency of the letter’s psychogenic substance. For, surely the letter killeth though the spirit giveth life.

[2]Absence of the writer too” impresses upon the non-agentic referent of a semantic semblant, the objet a-nalyticity of the propositions of desire. “For to write is to draw back. Not to retire into one’s tent, in order to write, but to draw back from one’s writing itself”. Even as the infant gleans the annihilating malodorousness of one’s own excremental joy in evacuating its significative vellities through the sensuous girdle of the sphincter, to be able to live the disgust of such faecal intercourse, meditating upon such vacuous arse-holism, “[t]o be grounded far from one’s language, to emancipate it or to lose one’s hold on it, to let it make its way alone and unarmed. To leave speech. To be a poet is to know how to leave speech”. Yet, to be an analysts is to play with the abject materials of the ‘objective’ as they impresses its obnoxious, ex-centric engram upon the psychisms of desire; seeing itself named in the objectal vectors of its symptomatic, symbolic invagination by the subject who pre-supposes an epistemology, even hears its name in his mouth—the dug of gnosis. The anal eroticism of big Other a-nalyst is commemorated as an impossible injunction in the clinic: to be loyal to the desire of the Other who has no other, in the introjected testimony of the big Other a-nalyst; in the sweet nothings and stools of psycho-analytic session material and theory alone can the mother-lode of theoretic, perspectival and experiential hermeneutic fecundity rupture its symptomal vein, and bleed meanings which are then absorbed, and institutionalised by the orally committed serialisation of analytic experience gaining their traction from the anal shibboleths of the big Other a-nalyst.

Is not this the reason why there is no God but the One who is the Tautology of the allmighty semblable? Even this tautology is the very mutability of all non-coincidentals of experience reified in the concretion of the dead letters that name it as a concept; even as it enlivens the jouissance that propels the odious dejecta of the small intestines into the mystical pitch of analytic psychosis, Puritan disgust and medical caution, and in its wake we find but the stench of the inexorable, ineliminable deeds prefigured therein. Interestingly then, irony blooms in the benison of the One that prefigures totality in the inception of its nomological I Am: the God who is but the One and only is also the absolute negation of his non-being in the Other, which he sustains as his train of semblation upon the Golgotha of discourse, the dunghill where the godhood of god is a pre-semblative latesence. [3]Behold, I will rebuke your offspring, and spread dung on your faces, the dung of your offerings, and you shall be taken away with it. God is not doubtful enough of his pleroma until he has shat a Thomas to do the deed prefigured in his not-being other than his own semblable: the allmighty Father of semblation, the Mother-lode of discourse made flesh; the mineral of truth and meaning is also the exhaustible oil in the lamps of those who wait with inviolate anticipation for the second coming of the One as tautology[4].

Even as Maya is the mother of the Buddha, even as excrement is the papamummy of the ticklish self semblable, the analyst is the product of symptomatic discourse writ preconsciously as the pericope of the psycho-analytic gestalt imagined by the hysteric subject, turned introjective under the gaze of the big Other analyst. In every case the semblable which insinuates the blind Cogito is form-a-tive of the principles of sufficiency and apoditic embodiment that are officiated by the discourse of the imaginary, through the symbolic, about the real, and are thereby amortised by the symbolic [in]-efficacy of the semblability posited in the symbolic analyticity of the objet d’ a-nalysis as a semantically invested content. [5]The attributes designated by a verbalised object appertain to the semantic domain of consciousness as the relata of semantic consciousness embodied in the objectal tendency to be subsumed in the discourse of the mental consciousness which verbalises its illocutionary existence as a subject; consciousness as such, free from objectal, and hence subjective, consciousness seen as an object, does not exist.

The objective, objectal, analytic and anal erotic are tied together in the push-pull, in-out frication between the genitive grounds of the self othered by perceptible entities and these entities introjected as independently existent for self-consciousness without; between writing and communication. [6]It is not the case that the form of the question of analytic judgement is established by the consistency of the referents of conceptual consciousness apprehending entities and terms expressing entities, but rather that the form of the question is the referent of [7]conceptual consciousness apprehending entities and of terms expressing these entities. It is, also, not the case that the form of the question is established by way of its of own character as the semantic referent of a conceptual consciousness apprehending attributes and of terms expressing these attributes but rather that the form of the question is the semantic referent of conceptual consciousness, and its character as apprehending attributes and terms to express them.

[8]Qualities, quantities, modes and their various determined states of Being lack a relationship with a topological externality from where they can be grounded in the ontological sense certainty implicit in the self-evidence of the subjective unity of understanding, i.e. they cannot be seen as visible objects since such a demarcation rests on the definitive influence of the objects’ difference, or resistance, from the peculiar impasses of its perceptibility; in so many words: it is none other than its own self-evidence. Yet, self-evidence is a predicate of Being in itself [intuitable only to the positer] which resists the totalising inertia of that which simply is without another, and it exists only as negativity for the object that may have been determined by an externality of space and time anterior to it and differentiated by it as an intuitable entity. This lability that remains the prerogative of the purely indeterminate is the universal nonentity of a semantically undetermined world, which is of no access to the logical faculties except as the noncoincidence of the object and its self-nugatory, or merely phenomenal, entity treated as the necessity of aleatory relationships between propositional relata and their states of mediate existence, i.e. their existence for a perceiver in a possible world.

I.                    Thus, nonbeing is prior to essence in the simple order of its anteriority to the overeager groping of the Ego, and its conscious contents before their mediation by the imposition of relationships between the knower and the known, reflecting the modes by which such knowledge posits the object and the subject as a comprehension not exhaustible by apperception alone.

[9]This notion without form, or abstraction, is itself enlightened by the self-evidence of the notion opposed to its contrary, and yet the contrary of an indeterminate notion is ‘nothing’ in the formal sense. Thus, the formal negation of an idea is rendered concretely when its positive determinations, i.e. its quality, quantity, mode, and their interrelationships, rend the garment of the propositional form that requires the identity of an object to itself, it non-contradiction of itself by differing with other objects and, thereby, by prepossessing a gestalt of differential identity ungrounded in the moment of sufficient reason, championed by transcendental philosophy. The validity or invalidity of an idea, then, is a matter of the correspondence between the relata of the propositional entity held in comparison to itself for itself, and to itself in another. Subjectivity is actually “[10]subject-objectivity” in that its determinants are not spatio-temporally tied to the Being of its comprehension as an abstract idea. Comprehending subjectivity as an abstract idea does not require that its object be separated from the desiderata that impel the inaugural question of its status as an object; comprehending subjectivity as a concrete idea demands an attitude of question begging whereby the motivic certitude which illuminates the obscure object that is laid bare in the contours of the question comes to resemble an idea which for all practical purposes did not exist before mediation. Yet, this shadow-objectivity betrays a similitude with light, wherein the occult invocation of shade presses itself into being by differentiating itself from the domain of brightness by collision with it.

II.                 That which is not there is full intuitable, and comprehendible, by its predilection for defining what it is not to the regime of consciousness. The Egotic awareness of objects, and ideas, obtains from their nullity in the subjective autonomy of consciousness perceived as an object; ideas which have no basis in lived experience yet possess as their objective character their inexistence in the world.

III.               The inexistence, or nonbeing, of an idea being anterior to its essence is nonetheless no proof for its in/coherence; the semantic field invoked by the idea is its only adequate judge for sufficiency.

Schelling’s Mirror^rorriM s’gnillehcS

The communion of the three insights, namely [1] that there is no time in the unconscious or non-thinking part of the mind, [2] that there is no relation of necessity between the ordinal and the nominal idea of rational exhaustion, and [3] that there is no necessary relation between the sufficiency of an idea and the semantic commitment of an idea for the concept in question to be coherent, real and capable of disclosure in both semantic and experiential terms creates a reflective foothold for speculative reason. [11]The idea of concepts which are intuitable as self-evident from participation in life rests lightly on its delicate analytic underbelly. What was once experience became a reflected label of knowledge; mediation then became an interregnum between thought being dissolved by the substantiality of its nonbeing and its projection of immanent Being realised in the aetiological present. Beyond this point, the Cogito of sense certainty has been stretched thin unless virtual plausibility, or what constitutes sufficient analytic description, is transformed by the negative into the plausible virtuality of the principle of sufficient reason. This entails thinking descriptions as creating events rather than events being mere representations of the actuality of the real; psycho-analysis is committed to the aetiological momenta of the present symptom[12], for here alone the prime agentic identity semblables reveal their maker’s desire as unthought.

I.          The Imaginary as narcissistically cathexed to the virtual actuality of desiring semblables:

First, the mirror gleans the Ego’s ascent through its inherent psychical predispositions; the distance which makes reflexion possible as removed from the present living moment as experienced by the idea also alienates the narcissistic big Other a-nalyst. He insinuates a surface of appearances that may be illusive, but their illusion is of another order abstracted upon the firmament of the signifier that is the One and only signifier of the self semblable; thus, it comes to be that the blind analyst finds his questioning to be the measure of sufficiency for analytic propositions, and, then coming to describe the semantic commitments of the these propositions by embodying their denotative and connotative illocutionary force, he instils in the phantasm of an a-nalytic structure in the atemporal unconscious his very semblable altered to suit his imaginary semantic commitments to the virtual actuality of his symptomatic discourse. Thus, [13]the imaginary comes to impregnate itself with the symbolic detritus of the big Other a-nalyst, and his allmighty narcissism.

II.         The Symbolic as the detritus of the anal eroticism of the big Other a-nalyst cathexed to the virtual virtuality of desiring semblables:

As the mutually differentiated nodes of the rapacious big Other a-nalyst and his One and only semblable come to maturity in the analyst’s psychotic capitulation to the insinuations of the former’s formidable imaginary commitments to the virtual actuality of its own desiring duality, or indeterminacy as concealed by the symptom, we have the emergence of the symbolic order of this big Other a-nalyst. The big Other a-nalyst excretes differential qualia, quanta and modalities of determination whereby the desire of an [14]auto-nominating Oedipus Complex becomes subservient to the unconsciousness of the big Other a-nalyst.

 

III.        The real as a psychotic bent of the big Other a-nalyst whose excretions concretise through the tradition of psycho-analysis and become portals of incalculable [15]spatiotemporal dedifferentiation and impossibilitisation of propositionality by the designative semantic commitments of its desire.

This order may be seen as the actual virtuality of all symbolic productions accruing from the symbolic maturation of imaginary narcissistic impulses issuing from the anal eroticism of the big Other a-nalyst and his One and only self semblable. The dead letter of the symbolic and the traumatic closure of the actual on the virtual actuality of the symbolic order, and its imaginary ordination to the self semblable, is naught but the impossible injunction of the big Other a-nalyst to impossibilise the closure of the actual on the spatiotemporal, and mediate, redundancy of the virtual actuality of symbolic propositions of desire.

Jung’s comments on Freud’s notion of sufficiency not being coterminous with the actuality of the real are equally applicable to the Lacanian triune of the real, the imaginary and the symbolic as the letter-ing of the real.

[16]We know that in the mind of a creator of new ideas things are much more fluid and flexible than they are in the minds of his followers. They do not possess his vital creativity, and they make up for this deficiency by a dogmatic allegiance, in exactly the same way as their opponents, who, like them, cling to the dead letter because they cannot grasp its living content. My words are thus addressed less to Freud, who I know recognizes to some extent the final orientation of the neurosis, that to his public, who continue to argue about his views”.


NOTES

[1] Freud, Sigmund. On Sexuality. “On Transformations of Instinct as Exemplified in Anal Eroticism”. P. 295- 303.

[2] Derrida, Jacques. (2001). Writing and Difference. “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book”. Oxon, UK: Routledge Classics. P. 85.

[4] “As soon as truth is a limit or has limits, its own, and assuming that it knows some limits, as the expression goes, truth would be a certain relation to what terminates or determines it”. Derrida, Jacques. Trans. Dutoit, Thomas. (1993). Aporias. “§ 1 Finis”. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. P. 2.

[5] Hopkins, Jeffrey. (2002). Reflections on Reality: The Three Natures and Non-Natures in the Mind-Only School. “Examining the Sūtra Unravelling the Thought. Imputational Natures I: The Illusion”. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. P. 196- 97.

[6] Ibid. P. 203.

[7] “the a-nalyst whose provenance extends across the being of the analyst by penetrating his innermost intentions and subjective relation[s] to jouissance, by the very auspice of the concept of conceptual possibility, and its prodigal objet d’ analysis[19], is only a proposition entailed by the regime of the allmighty semblable of semblation, and its analytic adequacy”. Jacan, Lacques. (2013). Smoke and Mirrors: The Seat of Analytic Judgement. < https://lacquesjacan.wordpress.com/2013/04/14/smoke-and-mirrors-the-seat-of-analytic-judgement/ >.

[8] Hegel, Georg, W. F. Trans. Harris, WM. T. (1869). Hegel’s First Principle: An Exposition of Comprehension and Idea [Begriff und Idee]. St. Louis, MO: George Knapp & Co. P. 7- 12.s

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid. P. 9.

[11] Whistler, Daniel. Eds. Masciandaro, Nicola, & Thacker, Eugene. (2013). Glossator: Practice and Theory of the Commentary Vol. 7. “Silvering, or the Role of Mysticism in German Idealism”. Brooklyn, NY: The City University of New York.  P. 151- 186.

[12] Jung, Carl, G. Eds. Read, Herbert, Fordham, Michael, & Gerhard Adler. (1961). The Collected Works of C. G. Jung Vol. 4: Freud and Psychoanalysis. “The History of Psychoanalysis: The Aetiological Significance of the Actual Present”. New York, NY: Pantheon Books Inc.

[13] “The basis of the imaginary order is the formation of the ego in the “mirror stage”. Since the ego is formed by identifying with the counterpart or specular image, “identification” is an important aspect of the imaginary. The relationship whereby the ego is constituted by identification is a locus of “alienation”, which is another feature of the imaginary, and is fundamentally narcissistic. The imaginary, a realm of surface appearances which are deceptive, is structured by the symbolic order. It also involves a linguistic dimension: whereas the signifier is the foundation of the symbolic, the “signified” and “signification” belong to the imaginary. Thus language has both symbolic and imaginary aspects. Based on the specular image, the imaginary is rooted in the subject’s relationship to the body (the image of the body)”. Žižek, Slavoj. < http://www.lacan.com/zizekchro1.htm >.

[14] “Although an essentially linguistic dimension, Lacan does not simply equate the symbolic with language, since the latter is involved also in the imaginary and the real. The symbolic dimension of language is that of the signifier, in which elements have no positive existence but are constituted by virtue of their mutual differences. It is the realm of radical alterity: the Other. The unconscious is the discourse of the Other and thus belongs to the symbolic order. Its is [SIC] also the realm of the Law that regulates desire in the Oedipus complex. The symbolic is both the “pleasure principle” that regulates the distance from das Ding, and the “death drive” which goes beyond the pleasure principle by means of repetition: “the death drive is only the mask of the symbolic order.” This register is determinant of subjectivity; for Lacan the symbolic is characterized by the absence of any fixed relations between signifier and signified” Ibid.

[15] “This order is not only opposed to the imaginary but is also located beyond the symbolic. Unlike the latter, which is constituted in terms of oppositions such as “presence” and “absence”, there is no absence in the real. The symbolic opposition between “presence” and “absence” implies the possibility that something may be missing from the symbolic, the real is “always in its place: it carries it glued to its heel, ignorant of what might exile it from there.” If the symbolic is a set of differentiated signifiers, the real is in itself undifferentiated: “it is without fissure”. The symbolic introduces “a cut in the real,” in the process of signification: “it is the world of words that creates the world of things.” Thus the real emerges as that which is outside language: “it is that which resists symbolization absolutely.” The real is impossible because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into the symbolic order. This character of impossibility and resistance to symbolization lends the real its traumatic quality” Ibid.

[16] Ibid. § 375, P. 167.

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