What is History?


The past is not an eidolon that can be excavated at leisure. The debris of its empire are not a monument, or a minaret, and he who seeks after its raw girth is not lost to the senses in which man, perforce, finds himself again and again, viciously pursued by a sentience greater than the sum of every arraigned chronology. An enigmatic gravity, which draws the inert materials that compose the flesh and blood of history by labour of our body, and compels the weight of this lion-sleep, this mediate inertia of recollection and appropriation, to fall plainly upon the better senses of our wake: history is the ancestor of this moment! Its annals writ in the glib aphoricity of its gad-flies, and megalomaniac bureaucracies, and courtroom stenographers, and under-graduate blogs, are the lingering, immanent spirit of a long deceased complexion of thought, even a Geist that may well descend upon us again; fresh as a long forgotten strain caught in the loopy preconscioning of its evocation; like a thief in the shade of our personal yggdrasils, at the edge of the thicket of forgetfulness, where at last we spot the glimmer of the sword which its bears for a tongue, lighting our way out of its precious blow.

2 thoughts on “What is History?

  1. “What matters is not the sublation of reality into actuality but the narrative embodiment of affective investitures as they determine the aetiological gestalt of the present. Thought is embodied in action, but action is an analogue of thought only retroactively made responsible to tokens of actuality, as it chafes against the fabric of time and space”.

    The present, as symptomal consciousness, is an analogue of the past:

    “The cultivated distraction which inhibits the analyst’s bildung is not of the order of mere contingency, it officiates the nomologically anterior engram of the anal-yst who takes heed from the imaginary gestaltism of the big Other a-nalyst. Then, the a-nalyst whose provenance extends across the being of the analyst by penetrating his innermost intentions and subjective relation[s] to jouissance, by the very auspice of the concept of conceptual possibility, and its prodigal objet d’ analysis[19], is only a proposition entailed by the regime of the allmighty semblable of semblation, and its analytic adequacy. This semblable of semblation emerges as the predetermining horizon of the session and an inavouable subject position which the analyst occupies axiomatically”.

    See my whole argument here:


  2. An interesting conversation on Facebook, regarding this post:

    “Vladimir Estragon The To-come is authentic. The has-been is always a fake receipt, a false-flag.
    2 hours ago · Like

    Lacques Jacan We who witness only the pure immanence of the To-Come always do well to excise from within our lucubrations the constellating prejudice of a discernible, analytic, apoditic desire for the das ding to come, even as we fumble in the marsh of Plato’s ‘anamneses’. Though the new wine runs its course with the old wine skin the knowledge of this rupture, this rending, colours the intoxication in the expectant audience of the To-Come with the sour pernancy of memory, of traumatic remembrance that hangs thread bear and falls like spent tea leaves on a witches’ table making this one prediction ad nauseum: the new is a chip off the old block, this is why it is newer than itself, the One true tautological semblable : the I Am of the To-Come!
    about an hour ago · Like”

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